Juice

On philosophical studies of central banking it is understood that central banks function as clearing houses for private banks. It is not so obvious to come to the conclusion that it is the non zero cost of transport (or settlement etc.) that creates value for a clearance house to exist.

Here we can understand what seems to be centralized to actually be comparable to a randomly distributed set of nodes (as if the central bank were ‘cyberspace’).

And thus we have shown the value of reducing the cost of base layer settlement or rather rendered it applicable to Szabo’s formalization of Smith:

--

--

The design for the new internet basically involved a browser that draws feeds from other sites and application in a drag drop fashion.

It not only gives the user ultimate customization and filter ability but profiles allow such user preferences to be customized and shared.

This new layer changes the market forces and incentives.

--

--

Thinking of a game with a small enough amount of players that makes the problem simple enough for them to identify the equilibrium. Could a coalition of states enter constitutional/contractual agreement to move the world off of any centralized base/reserve currency system, namely the USD.

There might need to be the ability to pre-sign and pre-commit some value (to contribute or loss etc.).

There could be other considerations like privacy in committing.

Bitcoin might be useful in this game but for what its limitations are could be made up with ‘politically’.

What role does John Nash’s works Ideal Money play in all this?

--

--