This will be a slightly esoteric writing that I will unpack and alter over time (hopefully soon etc.).
Re-Visting Szabonian Deconstruction
We previously developed and exemplified the concept we called Szabonian deconstruction-a method for traversing identified complexity or aka intersubjective truths. Here we will use Szabonian deconstruction to better understand another concept of Nick Szabo’s he wrote of called “Juristopia”
Re-Visting the Microkernel Government
Szabo extends the idea of Juristopia from the concept of Microkernals he defines here:
A microkernel in a computer is a small program that contains only the most essential functions needed to manage a large number of other programs called “servers” that are conceptually independent of each other. Similarly, our governmental microkernel provides only the miniminum procedural functionality needed to handle franchises, a wide variety of which in turn handle the substantive law.
Szabo cites wikipedia for the advantages of considering extending Juristopia from a microkernal:
* “security: it is more secure as more operations are done in user mode than in kernel mode” — similarly, the failure of one governmental function is much less likely to spill over into other functions or to cause general political failure. And since a small franchise requires fewer powers than a large government, any abuses of its powers are likely to be far less severe.
* “reliability: a simpler kernel design and functionality typically results in a more reliable operating system” — similarly, the compartmentalization produced by property rather than delegation relationships increases the reliability of each function.
* “flexibility: new features can be added and unnecessary ones can be removed. This makes it suitable for both large and small systems” — similarly, to add or remove a governmental function requires merely defining and funding a new franchise, or for a jury to defund it.
* “portability: most of the processor-specific code is in the microkernel, which makes it easier to port the kernel to a new platform” — similarly, our new form of government can be applied in a wide variety of contexts — as a new commercial jurisdiction, as the basis for an online game, or to augment or replace a traditional government
Re-visiting Juristopia
That Juristopia extends from the concept of a microkernal government is the key to understanding the insight in Szabo’s design he presents. The concept is a little easier to see in reverse hierarchy (which is possible how he came up with the design).
The “Extraordinary Jurisdiction” in Szabo design is the microkernal and it interfaces with the “Ordinary Jurisdiction”:
The Articles of Incorporation state that the Court of Extraordinary Justices exercises only a very narrow jurisdiction, called the Extraordinary Jurisdiction. All Ordinary Jurisdiction, and all armed forces and police powers besides the Rings, are auctioned off to the highest bidder as franchises.
The purpose and key seems to be the microkernal he provides (we haven’t describe it yet) fosters the concept of a free market for jurisdiction (franchises) thus allowing market competition and pricing optimize versus the complexity it means to order:
A number of general kinds of franchises are specified by the Articles: public nuisance suppression, fraud suppression, armed forces, police forces, and common law courts are the five main categories of franchises, but there is a vast variety of possible jurisdictional “boundaries” for franchises within each category, and ownership of franchises may be bundled within or across boundaries in a dizzying variety of ways. The franchise market can thus assemble bundles that best persuade juries of feepayers to maximize fees. Each franchise collects its own monopoly fees from all persons within its territory; no franchise may charge fees that are more than what a jury considers “reasonable”, including a reasonable profit. The general franchises stated in the Articles can be subdivided and narrowed, but not expanded, by the Board of Franchisors, which can pass bylaws that specify the subject matter and personal jurisdiction and territorial boundaries of each franchise. Some franchises are executive (similar to government agencies), and some are judicial (courts). The Board, like the Court, selects its own successors
Deconstructing Szabo’s Microkernal for Juristopia
Szabo presents his microkernal for Juristopia with the metaphor of Lord of the Rings:
To simplify discussions of political power and rebellion, let’s posit a system of magic Rings of Power, a la Tolkien. However, there is no master One Ring. (Tolkien surely had the correct answer for such a totalitarian power: it must be destroyed at all costs). Instead these are Rings of Discontempt that operate as follows:
(1) There are N Rings, where N is odd, say 9. Any Ring in the possession of an individual who possesses another Ring has no power (that includes the first Ring possessed — the second renders the first impotent — so that there is a strong disincentive to accumulate Rings).
(2) To operate the ring, a quorum of holders of the Rings, called the Court of Extraordinary Justices, touch their Rings together and prouounce the unique name of an individual to be punished for Contempt of Court, and pronounce a punishment.
(3) The quorum of joined Rings can administer the following magical punishments to the named person at any range:
(a) imprisonment in a magical jail for any specified number of time, requiring the aid of no human jailers
(b) instant and painless death(4) The Rings confer on their wearers complete invulnerability to any kind of violence.
There is no other magic of any sort in Juristopia.
I think perhaps we can simplify this (and so we reveal Szabo’s implicit intentions with his more complex presentation) by pointing out the purpose seems to be to create a fair oracle that enforces the markets that sell, create, and regulate franchises and their operations.
Notice Szabo says there needs to be an odd amount of rings. It’s not perfectly clear the intention. It seems maybe to have a tie breaker so the “Extraordinary Justices” never have a stalemate but perhaps that not even a problem? Can there be a contempt of court action enforced by less than a unanimous vote or less than majority?
Szabo doesn’t seem clear on this.
On The Checks and Balances in Juristopia
Szabo uses the concept of citizen lotteries to provide a extra separation of duty based oversight for each of the following:
Franchises are property rights to exercise certain narrowly defined governmental powers, subject to limitations on the monopolistic fees or taxes they may charge, determined by juries selected by lottery from the feepayers or taxpayers.
The Articles of Incorporation state that Juristopia Corporation itself does not have shareholders and may not earn a profit. Its only officers are members of the Board and Court, and the salaries of these are limited to salaries deemed “reasonable” by juries chosen by lottery from among Juristopia’ taxpayers
The Bill of Rights states a number of individual procedural rights, such as right to trial by juries, the right of juries chosen by a lottery of taxpayers to decide whether any taxes or franchise fees are reasonable, limits on search, seizure, and arrest, and so on that must be respected by any entity exercising a judicial or police power.
On the Department of Government Efficiency aka Doge As A Re-Mapated Example of Juristopian Franchises
The concept of the expansion of DOGE departments is easy to enter into as an example of a Juristopian set of franchises:
On The Consideration of AI/LLM’s as Extraordinary Justices of Truth
Here we mean to expand this later with respect to the concept of trustworthy LLM’s. For now consider how the global encryption games aka the meta-data collection program(s) heavily guarded national truth and data. Humans are now looking for a way to protect their longevity from non-human intelligence that will far surpass our human based capabilities.
Here we are thinking of the idea of giving each nation or major AI provider a ring in Szabo’s Juristopia microkernal. It seems this falls in line with Szabo’s intentions where the nations effectively have full rights to upgrade or replace their chosen AI:
Like the Catholic College of Cardinals, the Extraordinary Justices choose their own successors. Board of Franchsisor members also choose their own successors, but have no Rings. Combined with the magical Rings, self-succession allows the Extraordinary Court to avoid the two main sources of political bias and pressure from other branches of government they now face: from their initial appointments by other branches, and by the ultimate ability of an executive branch to ignore a court order that it despises.
There could be rules for the AI’s summarizing their outputs which are based on inputs and then comparing the summary them with the the individual output.
This consider coincidently aligns with Szabo’s stipulations:
All Justices and Board members must be eunuchs (if male) or artificially or naturally postmenstrual and sterile (if female), may own no amount or kind of property that a jury deems “unreasonable”, must dispose of any properties that will create an imminent conflict of interest, and must recuse themselves from any legislation or cases that create a conflict of interest. They may not reproduce themselves in any fashion.
Each nation is in the strictest competition today that exists with respect to their AI models and Szabo left thus a human based check/balance for the possibility of putting an AI model into contempt (thus the nations can choose their own ring bearer but still have to pass the sanity test of a lottery that draws on human propriety).
Truth in this sense is a reference to the complexity that the combination of the top AI models can traverse and make decisions and take actions on, but humans don’t have the capability or capacity to oversee, and with the optimized, enforced, and implied competition the microkernal role implies.
